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                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 14-1418 
   
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
BAWER AKSAL, 
                Appellant 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  2:12-cr-00577-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 




Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 13, 2015 
 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RENDELL, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2015) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Bawer Aksal was convicted in the District of New Jersey of having sexually 
assaulted a woman on a commercial airplane in flight. The victim, who used the 
pseudonym “Susan Thomas” throughout the trial, was a stranger to Aksal. A54; see A69. 
She fell asleep on the cross-country flight seated in the window seat next to Aksal who 
sat in the middle seat. See A64-66, 101. As she slept, Aksal touched her breasts and used 
his fingers to penetrate her vagina and anus. See A101-102. Aksal was convicted of two 
criminal counts for this conduct, which occurred in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the 
United States, see 49 U.S.C. § 46501 et seq.: (1) knowingly engaging in a sexual act with 
Thomas while knowing her to be incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, or 
physically incapable of declining participation in that sexual act, or incapable of 
communicating her unwillingness to engage in the sexual conduct in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2242(2) and 49 U.S.C. § 46506; and (2) knowingly engaging in sexual contact 
with Thomas without Thomas’s permission, and with an intent to abuse, humiliate, 
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2244(b) and 49 U.S.C. § 46506. See A4, A24-25. Aksal was sentenced to 97 
months imprisonment. A5. 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Aksal appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that (a) newly discovered 
evidence shows that Thomas committed perjury and the government misled the jury; (b) 
the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (c) the jury instructions 
were erroneous; (d) the District Court erred in admitting testimony that Thomas was a 
heavy sleeper; (e) his 97-month sentence was improperly imposed; and (f) his lawyer was 
ineffective in not providing professional advice about whether to accept a plea bargain. 




(a) Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
 Aksal asks the Court to take judicial notice that Thomas has, more than a year 
after the criminal trial, filed a civil lawsuit against Aksal and United Airlines. He argues 
that this newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Thomas and the government 
misrepresented Thomas’s intentions to file a civil lawsuit regarding the incident. 
 Aksal’s argument must be presented in the first instance to the District Court in a 
motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. See United States v. Lowell, 649 
F.2d 950, 966 (3d Cir. 1981). Because Aksal has not so presented this argument to the 
District Court, we decline to reach his argument on appeal.  
(b) Sufficiency of the Evidence 
                                              
 1 The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear Aksal’s challenge to 
his conviction and under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) to hear Aksal’s challenge to his sentence.  
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 Aksal argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knew Thomas to be 
asleep and thereby incapable of appraising the nature of, declining participation in, or 
communicating her unwillingness to engage in, the sexual conduct perpetrated by Aksal. 
 We exercise plenary review over challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 
16-17 (1978). The verdict is upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 Here, there was sufficient evidence to support Aksal’s conviction. In addition to 
Thomas’s testimony that she was asleep, the jury also heard testimony from a nearby 
passenger that he observed Thomas sleeping at the time of the contact. A115-16. The jury 
could draw the reasonable inference that if a nearby passenger knew Thomas to be 
asleep, Aksal also knew her to be asleep.  
 Aksal also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he acted with an intent 
to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. This argument likewise lacks merit. The jury could 
infer from Aksal’s conduct that he intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire, an 
inference made all the more likely by Thomas’s testimony that when she awoke and 
found herself under assault by Aksal, Aksal pulled her closer and whispered “kiss me.” 
A71.  
(c) Jury Instruction 
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 On count one (sexual contact with an individual incapable of appraising the nature 
of the act or of declining participation), the District Court instructed the jury that “[i]f you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was asleep at the time that the defendant 
allegedly sexually abused her, then the Government has met the burden of proof as to [the 
element of whether the victim was incapable of appraising the nature of the sexual 
conduct, or was physically incapable of declining participation in the conduct, or was 
incapable of communicating her unwillingness to engage in the conduct].” A389.  
 Aksal argues that this instruction, which he had agreed to, was erroneous because 
it “directs a verdict for the prosecution on an essential element of the offense.” Brief of 
Appellant at 38. The government concedes that the District Court should have phrased its 
instruction as a permissive presumption rather than a mandatory one, but argues that (a) 
the instruction was “invited error” as the Court used the instructions agreed upon by the 
parties; and (b) regardless, any error was harmless, as “it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
imagine a situation in which a sleeping individual can or did consent to engage in a 
sexual act.” See Brief of Appellee at 36.  
 Under the invited error doctrine, Aksal has waived his ability to challenge the 
instructions that he agreed to. United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2008), as amended (June 19, 2008). Moreover, even if the Court were to review the 
instructions, it would do so under the “plain error” standard of review, which requires 
Aksal to demonstrate, among other things, that the error affected the outcome of the 
District Court proceedings. See United States v. West Indies Tranport, Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 
305 (3d Cir. 1997). Aksal cannot do so here. The evidence supporting the determination 
6 
 
that Thomas was incapable of consenting and did not consent is compelling. Moreover, 
the jury was properly instructed on count two (knowingly engaging in sexual contact with 
the victim without the victim’s permission), and, in reaching a guilty verdict on that 
count, the jury determined that Thomas did not give her consent for the sexual contact.  
(d) Evidence of Thomas’s Sleeping Habits 
 The District Court admitted testimony from Thomas’s close friend, Anca 
Martinez, that Thomas was a heavy sleeper. Martinez testified that she stayed overnight 
at Thomas’s home “once every couple of days.” A364. Martinez also shared lodging with 
Thomas on a five-day trip to the Grand Canyon. Martinez testified that Thomas was a 
heavy sleeper who would regularly sleep through her alarms and needed to be physically 
shaken to wake up. A364. Aksal contends that the District Court erred in admitting this 
testimony because (a) Ms. Martinez’s observations of Thomas’s sleeping habits were 
limited in number; and (b) whether a person is a heavy sleeper in a bed is not necessarily 
probative of whether a person is a heavy sleeper on a plane. 
 “A district court’s ruling admitting witness testimony is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.” United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 251 (3d Cir. 2011). Relevant evidence 
is admissible unless a rule of evidence provides for its exclusion. United States v. Sriyuth, 
98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a 
fact [of consequence in determining the action] more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence” Fed R. Evid. 401. 
 We find no error in admitting this testimony. It is relevant because it tends to make 
more likely Thomas’s account that she did not wake until after Askal had penetrated her 
7 
 
anus with his thumb. No rule of evidence provides for its exclusion. Indeed, it qualifies as 
opinion testimony by a lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, as the testimony 
is “rationally based on [Martinez’s] perception,” is “helpful to . . . determining a fact in 
issue,” and is “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. 
Evid. 701.  
(e) Sentence 
 Aksal argues that the 97-month sentence imposed upon him was “a violation of 
the principle of parsimony,” Appellant’s Brief 39, because the District Court did not 
“explain why [it] believed that 97 months was not greater than necessary to comply with 
the purposes of sentencing,” Appellant’s Brief 41. Aksal also argues that his sentence 
“was a penalty for exercising the right to a jury trial,” as the government had initially 
offered him a plea deal which would have resulted in no prison time. Id. These arguments 
lack merit.  
 We review Aksal’s “sentence for reasonableness with regard to the factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). 
“In order for a sentence to be reasonable, the record must demonstrate that the sentencing 
court gave meaningful consideration to these factors.” Id. at 543 (quotation marks 
omitted). “In addition to demonstrating that it gave meaningful consideration to the § 
3553(a) factors, a sentencing court must demonstrate that it reasonably applied those 
factors to the circumstances of the case.” Id. 
 The record demonstrates that the District Court undertook a thorough and 
meaningful analysis of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and properly 
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imposed a bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence. See A462-74. Although the District Court 
did not specifically state that it was imposing the minimum sentence necessary to achieve 
the purposes of § 3553, there is no requirement that the District Court do so. See United 
States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[D]istrict judges are not required by 
the parsimony provision to routinely state that the sentence imposed is the minimum 
sentence necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2).”). 
 Aksal was offered a plea deal that would have resulted in no prison time because 
Thomas was initially reluctant to testify at trial. See A452. Aksal rejected that plea deal. 
A452. There is no evidence that the District Court penalized Aksal for refusing to accept 
that offer. The District Court did ask counsel for the government whether the Court 
should consider when sentencing Aksal “that your office as the law enforcement branch 
was willing to make an offer where [Aksal] would walk without any time.” A452-53. But 
it appears that the Court asked this question so as to consider whether a lesser sentence 
was appropriate in light of the earlier plea offer. The government argued that it would not 
be appropriate to consider the plea offer in setting a sentence, and there is no evidence 
that the District Court did so. See A451-453. Rather, the District Court imposed a 
bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence after considering the proper factors. 
(f) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
 Finally, Aksal argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide 
reasonable professional advice to accept the government’s plea offer. “Defendants are not 
generally permitted to attack the efficacy of their counsel on direct appeal, though an 
exception will be made “[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, [and thus] an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is 
not needed.” United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991)).  
 We decline to hear the ineffective assistance of counsel claim at this time.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons discussed, we affirm Aksal’s conviction. 
 
 
